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NOTES
DEFINING THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE
BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE IN
TITLE VII LITIGATION
The provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 place a sub-
stantial burden on employers to justify employment practices challenged
as discriminatory in application or effect.2 In the vast majority of cases,
this burden is outweighed by the benefits granted to employers under the
Act. For the small business, however, the need to justify a hiring practice
challenged as discriminatory can become an onerous burden on the com-
pany's economic resources.3 Such an employer must ultimately choose be-
tween incurring a severe financial deficit for litigation costs or abandoning
the employment practice in question.4 In many cases, the latter choice
presents the only feasible alternative for the businessman wishing to con-
tinue profitable operation of the enterprise.5
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited as Title
VII or the Act].
2. See Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. .4 No-
Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note].
The author gives three examples of the types of costs associated with Title VII compli-
ance:
First, the law may result in a loss of economic efficiency because it forbids the overt
use of race or color as a job requirement. A second cost to an employer results
when facially nondiscriminatory qualifications that can achieve efficiencies are
held to be unlawful. Finally, an "anticipatory" cost occurs if the employer substi-
tutes less efficient hiring or promotion practices for his normal procedures in order
to achieve results that reduce his risk of exposure to the enforcement machinery of
the fair employment law. Title VII reflects congressional consideration of each of
these three costs.
Id at 102. See also Landes, The Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL. ECON. 507
(1969). See generaly Fiss,A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 253-
63 (1971); United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, a f'd, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
3. Employers with less than 15 employees are not included within the mandates of
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
4. See generally 29 C.F.R. 1607 (1980) for examples of the extensive record keeping
costs required by these guidelines. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975); Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861
(1976).
5. Once a plaintiff establishes aprimafacie case of discrimination, the burden is upon
the employer to establish the defense of business necessity. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
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There are few legitimate defenses available in Title VII litigation. Con-
sequently, the courts have made a determined effort to narrow the subse-
quent implications of their decisions by limiting them to the specific
factual situation presented. Two recognized affirmative defenses, however,
exist as valid justifications for an alleged violation: the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (BFOQ)6 and the business necessity exception.7 Con-
gress included the BFOQ provision in Title VII in an attempt to minimize
the burdens of the Act in cases of legitimate employer need.8 This excep-
tion allows the employer to use otherwise prohibited classifications 9 as ex-
plicit criteria for employment decisions. It contemplates an intent on the
part of the employer to use overtly discriminatory criteria for employ-
ment.' o Its ultimate justification is the proven relationship between the
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), on remand, 390 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. Mo. 1975), a//'d, 528
F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976). See generally Note, Employment Testing.- The Aftermath of Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 72 COLUM. L. REv. 900 (1972). In this article, the author proposes
several justifications for placing the burden on the employer: availability of employer's
financial resources, employer access to information, and public policy favoring employees.
Id at 908.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976) states in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an
employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor
organization to classify its membership, or to classify or. refer for employment any
individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to
admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion,
sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise....
7. The business necessity exception is presently applied in situations involving a
facially neutral practice which has discriminatory results. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (involving general aptitude tests which were evenly applied but
found to have a discriminatory result); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th
Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 440 U.S. 625 (1979) (involving a facially neutral mini-
mum height requirement for county firemen); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446
F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971) (involving a facially neutral seniority system which perpetuated the
effects of prior discrimination).
8. See 110 CONG. REC. 2550 and 1325 for proposals in both the House and Senate to
add race to the BFOQ exception. Although these amendments were ultimately rejected, the
Representatives did pose some interesting examples of when race could be used as a legiti-
mate qualification by an employer, e.g., salespeople of products used primarily by blacks,
announcers on black radio stations, and the black theatre community. Although these situa-
tions were recognized as unique, on balance the Representatives felt that an amendment of
this nature would potentially undermine the purpose of Title VII.
9. The prohibited criteria are religion, sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)
(1976).
10. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980). In this recent case, the
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overt criteria and the legitimate needs of the business involved."
The business necessity defense, on the other hand, was judicially cre-
ated. It originated in the aftermath of Title VII when employers estab-
lished facially neutral job criteria as a pretext for discrimination.' 2 At
times, courts considered the establishment of these criteria permissible,
even though in violation of Title VII, if the qualifications set were neces-
sary for the efficient operation of the business.' 3 In its origins, this doc-
trine is distinguishable from the BFOQ provision in that it does not
require overt discrimination. Rather, the application of this defense is
based on the practical effect of the criteria involved.
The business necessity defense is presently applied to employment prac-
tices fair in form but discriminatory in effect. 4 Because this exception has
been so narrowly applied and because the BFOQ provision, by its lan-
guage, does not apply to discriminatory practices concerning race,' one
area has been left unexplored: the rare situation in which race is used as a
legitimate occupational qualification.' 6 This Note will investigate the pos-
court stated that "[wie believe that the omission of race and color as bona fide occupational
qualifications was deliberate and intentional on the part of Congress." Id at 535.
11. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 163-64 (5th Cir. 1980).
12. See generally Blumrosen, infra note 17.
13. Although the two defenses are distinct in origin, courts at times have confused them.
See, e.g., Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., [19731 6 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas.) 795 (court interpreted a facially neutral requirement of the ability to lift 150 lbs. in
terms of BFOQ); Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974), af d,
519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (analyzing a preg-
nancy disability as an aspect of the business necessity doctrine); deLaurier v. San Diego
Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978) (court analyzed maternity leave policy in
terms of business necessity).
14. See note 8 supra. See generally Note, Fair Employment Practices.- The Concept of
Business Necessity, 3 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 76 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Memphis Note];
Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46
U. CHI. L. REV. 911 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Comment]; Comment, Title VII:
Discriminatory Results and the Scope of Business Necessity, 35 LA. L. REV. 146 (1974).
15. Race is conspicuously absent from the BFOQ category. See note 8 supra. One com-
mentator suggests various ways in which an employer may wish to utilize race, i.e. wage
differentials in expectations, consumer's racial preferences, or as a societal recognition of
certain talents. Fiss, supra, note 2, at 248-58. See generally Yale Note, supra note 2, at 102.
16. For one example of this situation, see A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION,
Vol. 3 § 72.10 (1979) in which the author states:
Perhaps the only way an employer could deal with this type of problem would be
to cast his requirements in neutral terms so as to come within Griggs and its busi-
ness necessity rule. The employer might, let us say, announce that he will consider
applicants for the part of Henry VIII only if they bear a sufficient likeness to Henry
VIII so that, with suitable make-up, they would present a convincing representa-
tion of the well-known monarch. This would rule out women, and many men too
thin to be successfully padded out or too short to be adequately regal, as well as
most blacks. As to black applicants, the employer could quite possibly contend
1981]
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sibility of extending the business necessity doctrine to justify the use of
race as a standard or qualification for employment; in other words, ex-
tending the doctrine to overt as well as covert racial qualifications. It is the
author's contention that there is no restriction in either the decisions enun-
ciating the business necessity doctrine or in the legislative history of Title
VII that would foreclose this possibility. Even though lower courts have
interpreted the doctrine narrowly, an employer can legitimately utilize the
business necessity defense to justify an overtly discriminatory hiring pol-
icy. This Note will conclude that, if an employer can meet the rigid stan-
dards of justification applied in Title VII litigation, the business necessity
defense could be utilized to validate the challenged hiring policy.
I. ORIGINS OF THE BUSINESS NECESSITY DOCTRINE
A. The Title VII Problem Defined
When Congress passed Title VII, it anticipated compliance problems for
employers and granted a period for voluntary compliance before the Act
took effect.' 7 But even after this date, tangible guidelines for employment
decisions were practically nonexistent. 18 Many employers remained un-
certain as to the required method or extent of compliance, especially when
this new legislation imposed a major alteration in the functioning of the
business.' 9 For this reason, employers chose one of two possible alterna-
tives: changes in the present system to comport with the employer's inter-
pretation of Title VII requirements 20 or litigation to retain the existing
21system. The Act itself contained the BFOQ provision, but this presented
persuasively that no amount of white make-up would do an adequate job of trans-
formation, just as no amount of padding would save the day for a 110-pound white
aspirant. Therefore, the neutral test of rough similarity to Henry might be success-
fully backed up by the business necessity rule.
Id at 14-3, -4.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716(a), 78 Stat. 241. See Blumrosen,
Strangers in Paradise." Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimina-
tion, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972). Title VII became effective on June 16, 1968, a year after
the date it was passed.
18. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). This was the first
case interpreting the rights granted under Title VII. The Court determined that a rule
against hiring women with preschool children could be challenged under Title VII if men
with preschool children were hired by the same company.
19. See Blumrosen, supra note 17, at 61.
20. Professor Blumrosen notes two varieties of changes: adoption of tests or educational
requirements and changes in seniority systems. ld at 64.
21. Cf. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Local 189,
United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Gregory v. Litton Systems Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal.
1970); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 310 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. La. 1970); Clark v. Ameri-
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only a narrow exception. Many employers, unsure of the allowable em-
ployment options, litigated under novel theories, hoping to validate em-
ployment practices they felt should be allowed under the Act.22 The
employers' strongest claim was the allegation that some employment prac-
tices outlawed by the Act were essential to the efficient operation of their
businesses.2
3
B. The Griggs Decision
The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company24 clarified the
initial problems of compliance with Title VII faced by employers. Griggs
was a class action instituted by thirteen black employees of Duke Power
Company.25 The plaintiffs claimed that Duke's policy of requiring a high
school diploma or the passing of an equivalency test 26 for employment in
or transfer to the upper level job classifications 27 violated Title VII's man-
dates.
Under their Title VII claim, the employees presented two major argu-
ments.28 First, they asserted that the requirements operated to freeze the
can Marine Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. La. 1969); Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F.
Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
22. See cases cited in note 21 supra.
23. See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert
denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1974); Quarles v. Phillip Morris Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
24. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
25. See generally Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company.- Rumina-
tions on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844
(1972); Blumrosen, supra note 17.
26. The tests were the Wonderlic Personnel Test, a general ability test, and the Bennett
Mechanical Comprehension Test. These tests were found to be more stringent than the high
school education requirement in that they would screen out approximately half of the high
school graduates. 401 U.S. at 428.
27. The plant was separated into five departments: (1) Labor, (2) Coal Handling, (3)
Operations, (4) Maintenance, and (5) Laboratory and Testing. Blacks were only employed
in the Labor Department in which the highest salary was less than the lowest salary in the
four other departments. Promotions within departments were made on the basis of seniority
within the department, and a transferee into a new department would usually begin at the
lowest level. 401 U.S. at 427.
28. 401 U.S. at 426. At the time of the Griggs decision, Title VII provided in pertinent
part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful
19811
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effects of past discrimination in that whites already employed in the upper
level jobs without the educational prerequisites could transfer, while
blacks in the lower departments could not transfer without the required
education. Second, the employees maintained that the requirements oper-
ated to exclude a disproportionate number of blacks. They relied on
EEOC guidelines, mandating that, unless Duke could demonstrate the re-
quirements' job relatedness, the requirements must fail.29
The district court rejected the arguments raised by the employees. 30 It
ruled that, since Duke had abandoned its racially discriminatory policy
before Title VII became effective, it could not grant relief.31 Since the dis-
trict court conceded that Duke's present work force was tainted by the
vestiges of prior discrimination, 32 its holding directly refuted the employ-
ees' first contention that such discrimination violated Title VII. The court
rejected the rationale of another district court in a similar case3 3 and held
that Duke's educational requirements, if fairly and evenly administered,
were valid employment policies, even though they were not directly related
to job performance.34
employment practice for an employer ... to give and to act upon the results of
any professionally developed ability test, provided that such test, its administration
or action upon the results is not designed, intended, or used to discriminate be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 703(a) & (h), 78 Stat. 255 (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) & (h) (1976)).
29. The court quoted the EEOC guidelines on testing procedures in effect at the time as
follows:
The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed ability test"
to mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by the partic-
ular job or class of jobs which the applicant seeks, or which fairly affords the em-
ployer a chance to measure the applicant's ability to perform a particular job or
class of jobs. The fact that a test was prepared by an individual or organization
claiming expertise in test preparation does not, without more, justify its use within
the meaning of Title VII.
401 U.S. at 433 n.9.
30. 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
31. From the legislative history of Title VII, the court concluded that it could grant
prospective relief only, and to administer this relief there had to be a showing of overt dis-
crimination after the date of the Act's effectiveness. Id at 248, 251.
32. Id at 248.
33. Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). This case in-
volved restrictions upon employees in departmental transfers where the departments had
been previously organized in a racially discriminatory fashion which was held to be violative
of Title VII. Id at 510-21. The plaintiffs in Duke relied on Quarles to support their argu-
ment that present consequences of past discrimination were covered by Title VII, but this
proposition was specifically rejected by the lower court. 292 F. Supp. at 249.
34. 292 F.2d at 249-50. The court interpreted § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976),
along with § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976), to mean that Title VII does not bar the
[Vol. 30:653
Defining the Business Necessity Defense
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed in
part the district court's opinion.35 The circuit court agreed that Title VII
was designed solely to grant prospective relief, but it extended this relief to
alleviate the present effects of past discrimination.36 The court went on to
uphold the lower court's ruling that educational requirements do not have
to be job related, thus placing itself in direct opposition to a previous
EEOC interpretation.37 The court justified this holding by interpreting the
legislative history of Title VII to mean that to require an employer to bear
the burden of demonstrating a direct relationship between an employment
qualification and the specific task to be performed would be too stringent a
burden for an employer.3 8 Noting the congressional intent to permit cer-
use of a test which is a measure of general intelligence but unrelated to job performance.
Section 7030) states:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such indi-
vidual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the
total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any
employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by
any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other
training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section,
or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or
other area.
35. 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
36. Id at 1230. In doing this, the circuit court relied heavily on Quarles v. Phillip Mor-
ris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968), and quoted language of that case that "Congress
did not intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory pat-
terns that existed before the act." 420 F.2d at 1230, quoting Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
279 F. Supp. at 516.
37. 420 F.2d at 1233-35.
38. The court examined a memorandum of Senators Clark and Case [hereinafter cited
as Clark-Case memorandum] which it quoted as follows:
There is no requirement in Title VII that employers abandon bona fide qualifica-
tion tests where, because of the differences in background and education, members of
some groups are able to perform better on these tests than members of other groups.
An employer may set his qualifications as high as he likes, he may test to determine
which applicants have these qualifications, and he may hire, assign, and promote
on the basis of test performance. (emphasis added by court).
420 F.2d at 1235. See 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964). This controversy concerning the ability
of an employer to administer any type of test under Title VII started after the decision of the
Fair Employment Practices Commission in Illinois in Myart v. Motorola, Inc,, reproduced
in 110 CONG. REC. 5662-64 (March 19, 1964). This case suggested that standardized tests
could never be utilized by an employer even if justified by a legitimate business need. This
decision made many Congressmen wary of creating any limitation on an employer's ability
to use test results.
1981]
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tain employer discretion in determining competence of job applicants, the
court effectively rejected the employees' second contention that require-
ments, to survive a Title VII challenge, must be job related.39
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Sobeloff foreshadowed
the views that the Supreme Court would later adopt.4" Relying not only
on a prior EEOC interpretation of Title VII 4 but also on significant parts
of a district court opinion42 rejected by the majority, he concluded that a
discriminatory employment requirement which does not have a significant
relationship to a legitimate business need cannot survive a Title VII chal-
lenge.43 He interpreted the legislative history of Title VII to allow the use
of specific employment requirements only if these requirements were con-
clusively related to job performance."
In a unanimous opinion,45 the Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
peals.46 The Court addressed the issue of whether the establishment of
educational requirements for initial employment or intercompany transfer,
when the requirements were not substantially related to job performance,
effectively operated to exclude a disproportionate number of blacks and
perpetuate the vestiges of past discriminatory policies.
The Supreme Court rejected the circuit court's interpretation of Title
VII, concluding that the controlling purposes of the Act were to provide
equal opportunity and to remove any remainders of past discriminatory
barriers.47 In so deciding, the Court extended the Act's coverage to barri-
ers operating to discriminate invidiously as well as to those which were
overtly discriminatory. The determinative factor in justifying a challenged
employment practice is business necessity: if a practice operating in a dis-
criminatory fashion cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice must cease.48
Because Duke was unable to establish the link between the employment
criterion-a high school diploma-and job performance, the Court invali-
39. 420 F.2d at 1234-35.
40. Id at 1237-48 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
41. In placing reliance on the EEOC interpretation, the judge looked to the view ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court that a court should show great deference, when interpreting a
statute, to the officers or agencies charged with its administration. Id at 1240-41, citing
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
42. 420 F.2d at 1237, citing Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1968).
43. 420 F.2d at 1246.
44. Id at 1241-44.
45. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
46. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
47. Id at 429-30.
48. Id at 431.
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dated the requirement. In so doing, however, the Court explicitly recog-
nized the right of an employer to establish job criteria49 as long as they
"measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract."' 50 It
was thus expressly recognized that an employer could develop job criteria
as long as those criteria served as an objective measure of job perform-
ance. 51
C The Judicial Modification of Griggs
Although the Griggs decision cleared up the confusion among the lower
federal courts in determining the proper scope of Title VII, only a few
general guidelines bound the literal application of the Act's mandates. 2
The concept of business necessity, discussed by some courts prior to
Griggs,13 had to be modified to conform to the new standard enunciated in
Griggs.
Facing this challenge, different courts focused on various aspects of the
Griggs decision, thus creating multiple standards. 4 Shortly after Griggs,
49. Id
50. Id at 436.
51. The circuit court's reading of the legislative history of Title VII, especially its reli-
ance on the Clark-Case memorandum, supra note 38, was qualified by the Court. Looking
more extensively into the legislative background, the Court stated in reference to the memo-
randum:
However, nothing there stated conflicts with the later memorandum dealing specif-
ically with the debate over employer testing, 110 CONG. REC. 7247. . . I in which
Senators Clark and Case explained that tests which measure "applicable job quali-
fications" are permissible under Title VII. In the earlier memorandum Clark and
Case assured the Senate that employers were not to be prohibited from using tests
that determine qualifcations. Certainly a reasonable interpretation of what the
Senators meant, in light of the subsequent memorandum directed specifically at
employer testing, was that nothing in the Act prevents employers from requiring
that applicants be fit for the job.
Id at 435 n. 11.
52. See Memphis Note, supra note 14, at 83; Chicago Comment, supra note 14, at 918.
53. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416
F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (case decided before Griggs hold-
ing that employment practices with a discriminatory impact can be justified if there is a
legitimate, overriding nonracial business purpose); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight Inc.,
431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1970) (holding that an employment
practice with a disparate impact can be justified by business necessity only if it is found to be
necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the employer's business).
54. Compare United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971) (to
validate an employment practice which is challenged as having a disparate impact, an em-
ployer must show that the practice in controversy is essential to the safe and efficient opera-
tion of the business) and United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972) (employer must show practice necessary for safety and
efficiency) with Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir.), reh. denied,
494 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1974) and Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40 (5th
19811
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though, one court formulated a test which amalgamated the several theo-
ries of business necessity. In Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was faced with an
employee challenge to a seniority system created by a collective bargaining
agreement within the corporation.16 The petitioner alleged that the sys-
tem, though neutral on its face, created a discriminatory barrier to the ad-
vancement of certain black employees.
The opinion, written by Judge Sobeloff, the lone dissenter in the Griggs
decision at the appellate level, illustrates a sophistication of his prior inter-
pretation of the Act. After determining that the system discriminated
against the black employees as alleged,57 the court examined the purpose
of the policy. If Lorillard could assert a valid business reason for its crea-
tion and perpetuation, this system would not be struck down as violative of
Title VII.5" The court formulated a three-part test to assess the reasons
advanced as business necessities by the defendant:
[T]he business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to over-
ride any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively
carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there
must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices
which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced,
or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial im-
pact (footnotes omitted).59
Applying this test to the justifications advanced by Lorillard, the court
struck down the system as violative of Title VII.60 Although Lorillard was
Cir. 1974) (an employer cannot claim business necessity unless there is no other employment
possibility available with lesser racial impact) and with EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976) (business necessity can be established by
showing the challenged practice is related to job performance).
55. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
56. The challenged provisions allowed a transferring employee who was laid off from
his new job due to lack of seniority to return to his old department and retain his seniority
there. It also provided that job openings would be filled by the most senior interested em-
ployee within the department without regard to prior experience. Finally, employees who
did transfer gave up seniority and began as new employees in the new department. Id at
794.
57. Id at 795-96.
58. Id at 797.
59. Id at 798.
60. The system was found to discriminate against certain black employees who were not
able to transfer as readily as whites. The court did not accept any of Lorillard's justifications
for the discriminatory impact. The reasons proffered were industry practice, previous expe-
rience, avoidance of union pressure, and efficiency, economy, and morale. Id at 798-99.
The court stated that the last of these came the closest to a valid justification, but Lorillard
was not able to establish enough evidence of the required relationship to the challenged
employment practice. Id at 799-800.
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unable to satisfy the requirements for the business necessity defense, the
test used by the court has been applied to analyze other practices chal-
lenged under Title VII.
The first prong of the test suggests a balancing approach,6 weighing the
necessity of the practice against its discriminatory impact. Although the
legislative history of Title VII is silent concerning business necessity, the
congressional discussions do recognize that the judiciary should have the
opportunity to assess the facts of each case.62 With this flexible posture, a
court retains the ability to consider the monetary cost of compliance to the
employer, evaluating the size of the business and the number of employees
affected. This balancing approach gives the court an opportunity to make
individual decisions, a power contemplated by the drafters of Title VI!.63
The second phase of the Lorillard test involves the apportionment of the
burdens of proof involved in the business necessity defense. It requires the
employer to offer proof that there is a tangible connection between the
discriminatory employment practice and the business purpose it is mi-
tended to further.' This aspect of the test incorporates touchstones of the
previous business necessity defense: safety, efficiency, and necessity. 65
Additionally, this prong of the test considers the burdens of proof each
party must bear. Although this aspect was not fully developed in Loril-
lard, it was later refined by the Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson.66
That case involved a facially neutral statute which required that a person
61. For an analysis and favorable critique of the Lorillard balancing approach, see
Memphis Note, supra note 14, at 85. But see Yale Note, supra note 2, where the author
rejects the notion of a balancing approach and suggests the acceptance of a "no-alternative
approach." See generally Note, Facially Neutral Criteria and Discrimination Under Title VII.
'Built-in Headwinds,' or Permissible Practices?, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 97, 109 (1972); Note,
Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation: A Uniform Standardfor
Both Public and Private Employers, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 505 (1973).
62. See 118 CoNG. REC. 700 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Fannin: "civil rights are a matter
of human understanding and common sense, qualities possessed by the judiciary as much as
by any agency"); 117 CONG. REC. 32091 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Ford); id at 32101 (re-
marks of Rep. Shopu: "courts are designed to balance all issues"). This is also the reason
the EEOC was not given cease and desist powers. See 117 CONG. REC. at 3136 (remarks of
Rep. Allen, stating that he feared that a hearing before such a predispositioned group would
effect business efficiency). See also id at 32108 (remarks of Rep. Patrick, to the same effect).
See generally Yale Note, supra note 2, at 105 n.33, 112 n.64.
63. See generally Yale Note, supra note 2, at 105 n.33, 112 n.64.
64. For a specific example relating to employment testing, see 29 C.F.R. 1607 (1970).
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Spurlock v. United Airlines Inc.,
475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La.
1971), afl'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
65. 444 F.2d at 798.
66. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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filling the position of corrections counselor 67 must weigh at least 120
pounds.68 The Dothard court stated that, to establish aprimafacie case of
discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged stan-
dards operated in a discriminatory fashion.69 This was to be accomplished
by showing that the standards, in effect, attained an unjust pattern of hir-
ing. The employer must then justify the practice by demonstrating a re-
lationship between the practice and the job.7 ' If the employer meets this
burden, the plaintiff may then proffer other procedures which would attain
the same goals with a less disparate impact.72 This apportionment of the
burdens of proof serves two important purposes in the litigation. First, it
forces the employer to demonstrate the job relatedness required by Griggs.
Second, it allows the trier of fact to assess the strength of the relationship
as well as the tangible connection between the qualification and job per-
formance.7 3 This aspect of the test comports with other interpretations of
Title VII by allowing an employer to create a qualification and, if ap-
proved by the trier of fact, to provide employment opportunity to all who
meet the qualification.74
The last aspect of the Lorillard test requires the absolute necessity of the
practice.75 Business necessity is distinguishable from business ease, pur-
pose, or convenience. 76 The employer must establish the unavailability of
other means to achieve a goal that is absolutely necessary to the efficient
operation of the business. This is also the stage at which any suggested
alternative methods are assessed with respect to their business efficiency as
67. Correctional counselor is a reference to a prison guard. Id at 323.
68. The statute in question also required a minimum height of five feet two inches. The
statute provides:
Physical quafifcations-The applicant shall be not less than five feet two inches nor
more than six feet ten inches in height, shall weigh not less than 120 pounds nor
more than 300 pounds and shall be certified by a licensed physician. . . as in good
health and physically fit for the performance of his duties as a law enforcement
officer.
ALA. CODE, § 36-21-46(a)(4) (1975).
69. 433 U.S. at 329. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
70. 433 U.S. at 329. This can be accomplished by the use of statistics. Id at 330. See
also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 (1977).
71. 433 U.S. at 329.
72. Id at 330-33.
73. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
74. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
75. 444 F.2d at 798.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal, 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972) (business necessity does not mean business convenience); Myers
v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 550 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1977)
(immediate compelling need for practice is a basis for business necessity).
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well as racial impact." The employer can come forward with the reasons
for establishing the practice, and the employees can highlight alternative
methods of attaining the goal which would result in a lesser racial imbal-
ance.
78
In Lorillard, the court formulated a precise method for an application of
the theory expressed in Griggs.79 Although Lorillard perhaps added to
Griggs in some respects, the underlying rationale of both cases is similar.
While some courts use alternative methods of analysis, ° even these courts
find that their method could be incorporated into the Lorillard test for a
more thorough analysis of the factual situation. Therefore, the test enunci-
ated in Lorillard appears to be the most acceptable method of analyzing
the business necessity defense.
II. APPLICATION OF THE Griggs-Lorillard STANDARD TO RACIAL
EMPLOYMENT CRITERIA
A. The Legislative Intent of Title VII
Since the business necessity defense was judicially created, there is no
discussion of it in the legislative history of Title VII. Nevertheless, a court
must examine the compatability between the basic objective of Title VII
and the business necessity defense. The present conservative application
of the business necessity defense evidences the basic canon of statutory
interpretation that a court will not interpret a statute in a way that frus-
trates its intent.8" The judiciary will not frustrate the valid purpose of Title
VII by allowing a defense having an over-broad application. 2
77. The degree to which this must be shown is presently uncertain. The major area of
confusion rests in the allocation of the burden of proof of this fact. See, e.g., Boston Chap-
ter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974) (court's holding specifically in-
cluded as a major factor the lack of proof by the employer of unavailability of alternatives);
Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973) (court speaking of lack of
employer's investigation into alternative means of compliance). See also Yale Note, supra
note 2, where the author argues that, before an employer can utilize the business necessity
defense, he must prove the absolute unavailability of alternative means of compliance.
78. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971). See also
Sagers v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ga. 1973); United States v.
Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n of Steam, 360 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), a l'd on other
grounds, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
79. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
80. See Chicago Comment, supra note 14, at 920, where the author states that, while
courts may formulate their business necessity tests in other words, the Lorillard test is still
the conventional one.
81. Accord Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169 (M.D. Ala.), a ffidinpart, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
82. See generally New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973);
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Two major interpretations of the goals of fair employment laws such as
Title VII have been advanced: equal achievement and equal treatment.83
The equal achievement interpretation analyzes the literal outcome of job
distribution. It emphasizes the practical consequences of the use of race as
an employment criterion. This theory ultimately proposes a redistribution
of jobs in order to place minority workers on equal footing with the major-
ity.84 The alternative interpretation, proposing equal treatment of individ-
uals, completely ignores race in employment decisions and thus hopes to
place the minorities in a position of equal opportunity with the majority."
A close reading of the legislative history of Title VII suggests that it
adopts an equal treatment approach.86 It proposes the norm of "color
blindness" in employment decisions. But even with this foundation of
color blindness, the framers, cognizant of the financial and production as-
pects of a business, were sensitive to the potential costs this law could im-
Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84 (1934); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287
U.S. 341 (1932); Danciger v. Cooley, 248 U.S. 319 (1919).
83. Professor Fiss states that there are two theories on interpreting fair employment
laws. Fiss, supra note 2, at 239-49. This has become the standard form of interpretation.
Chicago Comment, supra note 14, at 921. In this comment, the author analyzes the business
necessity defense under these two theories and concludes that the equal treatment interpre-
tation is more suitable to the present application of the business necessity defense. Id at
921-25.
84. Fiss states five possible theories underlying this interpretation: self-interest of
blacks, redistribution of wealth from rich to poor, efficiency, furtherance of social objectives,
and responsibility for inferior economic position. Fiss, supra note 2, at 245-49. See also
Tobin, On Improving the Economic Status of the Negro, 94 DAEDALUS 878 (1965) (predicting
that an ever-increasing demand for labor will eventually improve the status of blacks).
85. Fiss suggests that two principles are at the root of this theory. First, an individual's
race is not an accurate predictor of his productivity. Second, to judge a person on the basis
of race is to do so on the basis of a predetermined factor. But see Winter, Improving the
Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against Discrimination: A Reply to Professor
Sovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 817 (1967) (suggesting that Fiss' correlation between employ-
ment laws and economic status may be unfounded).
86. Senators Clark and Case, the floor managers of Title VII, defined discrimination in
a memo which comports with the equal treatment interpretation:
To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor,
and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by
section 704 are those which are based on any of the five forbidden criteria: race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin. Any other criterion or qualification for
employment is not affected by this title. 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
See also 117 CONG. REC. 31974 (1971) (Rep. Mitchell's remark that "we have an objective of
equal treatment under the law."). For comments made during the 1964 hearings on the
debate between equal achievement and equal treatment, see 110 CONG. REC 1518 (1964)
(remarks of Rep. Celler); id at 1540 (remarks of Rep. Lindsey); id at 5092, 5094 (Sen.
Humphrey's remarks); id at 12617 (remarks of Sen. Muskie). See generally Vaas, Title VII:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. AND COM. L. REV. 431 (1966); Sape and Hart, Title VII
Reconsidered- The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824
(1972).
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pose. With this in mind, the legislature attempted to draft Title VII
carefully to avoid interference with the production or efficiency of an es-
tablished operation. 87 At the same time, they tried to minimize compli-
ance hardships for employers.88 Furthermore, when Title VII was
amended in 1972, Congress explicitly considered and approved the Griggs
business related standard.89 It is apparent that the drafters of Title VII
intended to alleviate all forms of discrimination, but not in a way which
would disrupt the efficiency of a necessary business practice.9"
In applying Title VII's objective of equal treatment of individuals to the
proposed extension of the business necessity defense, a facial conflict ap-
pears to exist. Since the extension advances the use of race as an employ-
ment criterion, it appears to conflict directly with the accepted goal of Title
VII. Yet the direct and essential relationship between the proposed exten-
sion and job performance can be sufficient to justify the use of race as an
employment criterion when it is warranted by the circumstances of the
case. Thus, when a challenged employment practice can be justified in
terms of business necessity, it would not be contrary to the legislative his-
tory of Title VII to allow the use of race as an employment criterion if the
defense is applied in a limited manner.
B. Extension of the Business Necessity Defense
Most of the cases in which the business necessity defense has arisen have
involved factual situations similar to Griggs.9' Almost universally, the de-
87. See Memo by Senator Case which states:
Whatever its merits as a socially desirable objective, title VII would not require,
and no court could read title VII as requiring, an employer to lower or change the
occupational qualifications he sets for his employees simply because proportion-
ately fewer Negroes than whites are able to meet them. Thus, it would be ridicu-
lous, indeed, in addition to being contrary to title VII, for a court to order an
employer who wanted to hire electronics engineers with Ph.D.'s to lower his re-
quirements because there were very few Negroes with such degrees or because
prior cultural or educational deprivation of Negroes prevented them from qualify-
ing. And, unlike the hearing examiner's interpretation of the Illinois law in the
Motorola case, title VII most certainly would not authorize any requirement that
an employer accept an unqualified applicant or a less qualified applicant and un-
dertake to give him any additional training which might be necessary to enable
him to fill the job.
110 CONG. REC. 7246-47 (1964).
88. Id
89. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 31961 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Perkins).
90. See note 87 supra.
91. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F.
Supp. 361 (E.D. Va. 1977), aft'd, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Virginia, 454
F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1978); Bridgeport Guardians v. Bridgeport Police Dep't, 431 F.
Supp. 931 (D. Conn. 1977).
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fense has been applied to practices which are fair in form but discrimina-
tory in effect. Even in these cases, the defense has been restrictively
applied.92 This judicial conservatism is critically linked to the recognition
of the Title VII's vital purpose and the view that a liberal interpretation of
business necessity would frustrate that purpose.93 In attempting to limit
broad ramifications of decisions accepting the business necessity defense,
courts have specifically limited their holdings to the unique factual situa-
tions before them.94 Despite this limited application, an employer can still
present a court with the requisite factual criteria to establish the defense.
When an employer can meet the required burdens of proof, and where the
acceptance of the defense would not undermine the purpose of Title VII, a
court must accept the business necessity defense.
In contrast to the business necessity defense, the BFOQ provision has
been judicially interpreted as intentionally limited.95 Perceiving the poten-
tial for an exception of this nature to undermine the basic objective of Title
VII, courts have found the omission of race from the BFOQ provision to
be a deliberate act by Congress.96 Thus, the BFOQ defense has been very
narrowly applied and used only in the few situations contemplated by its
language.97 The BFOQ provision contemplates a practice that is "reason-
ably necessary ' to a business endeavor, while the business necessity de-
fense is phrased in terms of absolute necessity.99 Since the latter was
judicially created to apply to circumstances not covered by the former, it
should logically apply to a wider array of situations. Thus, the burden of
proof in the business necessity defense is correspondingly higher than in
the BFOQ provision.
If a court were presented with an employer's attempt to justify overtly
discriminatory hiring criteria not covered by the BFOQ provision by using
the business necessity defense, logically there would be nothing to bar the
court from accepting this defense, as long as the employer could meet the
stringent burdens of proof. While this may appear, at first glance, to be an
extreme proposition, it is harmonious with the language of Griggs and the
legislative intent of Title VII.
Initially, there is no language in the Griggs decision limiting the business
92. See cases cited in note 91 supra.
93. See Annotation, 36 A.L.R. Fed. 9, 28 (1978).
94. See cases cited in note 91 supra.
95. Swint v. PuUman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1980).
96. Id
97. Id
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
99. See notes 75-78 and accompanying text supra.
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necessity defense to the factual situation presented therein. The decision
was couched in general terms in which the Court enunciated the employ-
ment practices forbidden by Title VII:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also prac-
tices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited.100
With this language, the Court created the concept of business necessity,
but left the hazards of its application to lower courts.
While the theory that employment decisions made in consideration of
race can be justified through business necessity may be novel, courts have
previously recognized the possibility that some employment decisions
could be based on race. Though the cases do not employ a business neces-
sity analysisper se, the underlying theories espoused are nevertheless sig-
nificant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
considered such a case in Baker v. City of St. Petersburg,'° l which was
brought under a constitutional challenge since, at the time the litigation
occurred, Title VII was not applicable to municipal police departments.'
02
The case challenged certain practices of the city's police department to as-
sign black officers to only one geographic zone, an area which encom-
passed all the major black areas of the city.'0 3 Although white officers
were occasionally assigned to zones overlapping part of the unique zone, a
white officer was never assigned solely to that particular zone."
In its decision, the court invalidated this pattern of assignments as viola-
tive of the equal protection clause. However, it specifically limited the ef-
fects of its holding to the situation presented by the case, L e., where black
officers were assigned exclusively and permanently to patrol one area.'0 5
The court left open the possibility that assignments could be made on the
basis of race if they were made in a way which would not offend constitu-
tional rights."° The court even presented two situations when decisions
100. 401 U.S. at 431.
101. 400 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1968). See generally Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protec-
tion Clause Bars Assignment of Police Officers Solely on the Basis of Race, 19 J. PUB. LAW
189 (1969); Comment, Race as a Basisfor Police Duty Assignments, 49 B.U.L. REV. 590
(1969).
102. Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1979) (case upholding
the constitutionality of the 1972 amendments which extend Title VII's coverage to municipal
employees).
103. 400 F.2d at 295-96.
104. Id at 296.
105. Id at 300-301.
106. Id
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based on race could be justified: undercover work and periods of high
racial tension.' While the racially-based policy in this case was struck
down, the decision illustrates a judicial attempt to validate assignments
based on race in a unique but realistic situation.
A recent circuit court case involving a claim of overt racial discrimina-
tion illustrates the possible application of the business necessity doctrine to
validate a similar employment situation. Application of the test as formu-
lated in Lorilard does not foreclose the possibility of an employer's assert-
ing and a court's accepting this defense against a claim of overt racial
discrimination. In Miller v. Texas State Board of Barber Examiners, °8 the
plaintiff alleged that an employment practice was overtly discriminatory
and thus violative of Title VII. Miller, a black male, was hired by the
Board in 1967 as an undercover investigator of state barber shops and col-
leges. He held this position for four years, investigating both black and
white facilities. In 1969, Miller was promoted to the position of inspector
for the express reason that white inspectors who were assigned to inspect
black barber shops had refused to do so for fear of physical violence.
Miller's supervisors explained the situation to him explicitly and offered
him the promotion, making it clear that he would inspect primarily black
shops. Miller accepted the promotion.
Miller worked until 1973, inspecting mostly black barber shops. Unlike
the majority of other inspectors, however, he was assigned to a specific
district which covered an area larger than that of the other inspectors.
During this time Miller travelled throughout the city and voiced no com-
plaints concerning his assignment.
In 1973, four years after his promotion, the Board became dissatisfied
with Miller's work. The Board members asserted that he conducted unau-
thorized inspections outside his assigned area, causing a strain on the
budget for travel and per diem expenses. The Board was also dissatisfied
with the apparent quality of the inspections Miller conducted. After dis-
cussing this situation at an employment hearing, the Board voted to trans-
fer Miller to the Houston area in an attempt to rehabilitate him. Upon
receiving these instructions from his supervisor, Miller neither followed
107. The court presented these examples, specifically restricting its holding by stating
"[wie do not hold that the assignment of a Negro officer to a particular task because he is a
Negro can never be justified." Id In a footnote to this sentence the court stated: "For
example, the undercover infiltration of an all-Negro criminal organization or plainclothes
work in an area where a white man could not pass without notice. Special assignments
might also be justified during brief periods of unusually high racial tension." Id at 301 n.l 1.
108. 615 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1980).
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them nor informed the Board of his opposition to them. Shortly thereafter,
he was discharged.
After exhausting the available administrative remedies, Miller instituted
a Title VII discrimination action against the Board. He had two claims:
first, that he was fired because of his race; and second, that his original job
assignment constituted treatment tantamount to a constructive dis-
charge.' °9 The first claim was dealt with summarily by both the district
and circuit courts. The circuit court found that there was substantial evi-
dence to support the district court's finding that Miller was discharged not
because of his race, but because he refused to go to Houston and did not
inform the Board of his opposition to the transfer." 0
It was in examining Miller's second claim that the circuit court discussed
the concept of business necessity. Miller specifically alleged that the delib-
erately disparate treatment he had received in his job assignment consti-
tuted the basis for his refusal to go to Houston, an act which ultimately led
to his discharge. Based on this claim of unfair assignment to only black
shops, the court decided Miller's case, holding that Miller was not entitled
to any back pay or benefits because he had suffered no financial loss due to
his assignment.. and that he was not entitled to reinstatement because he
had been discharged for a valid reason.' 2 The court lastly denied him an
award of attorney's fees.' 13
Though the concept of business necessity was not ruled upon by the
circuit court, the case presents a unique factual situation in which the de-
fense as formulated in Lorillard could logically be extended to Miller's
assignment because of race. This conclusion appeared so logical that ap-
pellant, appellee and the trial judge simply assumed that the business ne-
cessity defense was applicable to the overtly discriminatory practice.'
1 4
109. Id at 652. The doctrine of constructive discharge grants a Title VII cause of action
for wrongful discharge when an employer intentionally creates a discriminatory environ-
ment which literally forces the employee to involuntary resignation. Calcote v. Texas Educ.
Foundation, Inc., 578 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1978), ciing, Young v. Southwestern Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975).
110. 615 F.2d at 652.
11l. Id at 654.
112. Id
113. Id at 655.
114. Id at 654. The pertinent part of the district court's unreported memorandum opin-
ion and order states:
The Court is of the opinion that Defendant has rebutted Plaintiffs allegation of
any racial discrimination by Defendant against him, either during his employment
or at the time of his termination. Defendant's different treatment of Plaintiff dur-
ing his employment as an investigator and an inspector appears to the Court to
have been justified because of Defendant's legitimate purpose of investigating and
overseeing the operations of black barber shops. Since there were no other black
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The issue tried was not whether the business necessity defense applied, but
whether the Board's practice met the requirements of business necessity." 5
If a court were to apply the factors as set forth in Lorillard, the practice
could probably be justified under the business necessity defense." 16
The first prong of the Lorillard test balances the importance of the busi-
ness purpose advanced by the criterion against its racially discriminatory
impact. 1 7 The racial impact of Miller's original assignment, to inspect
only black barber shops, was a condition of which Miller had been aware
when promoted. Realistically, it was the reason for his promotion in 1973.
In his suit, however, Miller complained not about this but rather about his
assignment to the Houston area." 18 The tangible racial effects were limited
to Miller himself and resulted from a condition of which he was aware.
Further, Miller did not demonstrate that he was limited to inspecting black
shops, but only that he was assigned on a basis of need.
On the other side of the balance, the purpose of the assignment was
twofold: to enforce compliance with safety and health regulations and to
minimize any threat of physical violence to the other inspectors. The first
purpose advanced the general goal of inspection of the facilities. Miller
was to make sure each facility was safe and in compliance with state health
provisions, the job of all inspectors. The second purpose, however,
presented the unique situation where, because of his race, Miller was the
only inspector who could safely accomplish this task. The other inspec-
tors, who were white, refused to inspect the facilities because of a fear of
violence. If they were forced to go to these shops, they would have been
fearful and would probably have performed a cursory inspection or bla-
tantly refused to perform any inspection at all. In Miller's case, these
problems were not present. Balancing the need for enforcement of safety
and health codes against the racial impact of having Miller inspect all the
black shops, the balance should logically sway toward safety and health.
investigators or inspectors and since the remaining investigators and inspectors
would not do the job that Plaintiff willingly did, Defendant was justified in requir-
ing that Plaintiff investigate or inspect primarily black barber shops.
Brief for Appellant at 9-10, Miller v. Texas State Board of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650
(5th Cir. 1980). The court also concluded that plaintiff's termination was not based on race:
Defendant had requested that Plaintiff report to work in Houston in October 1973,
and when Plaintiff failed to appear, he was terminated. Plaintiff was not treated
differently because of his race or any other reason when he was terminated, but
rather he was treated as any other employee who failed to report for work.
Id at 10.
115. 615 F.2d at 654.
116. The circuit court did not decide if the doctrine was applicable.
117. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra.
118. 615 F.2d at 652.
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In apportioning the burden of proof according to the second phase of
Lorillard,"19 Miller would easily meet the burden of establishing aprima
facie case of discrimination. 20 The circuit court admitted that Miller was
treated differently because of his race, and this would meet the minimum
requirements of a discrimination case.' 2 ' After this, the burden would
shift to the Board to establish the requisite relationship between the assign-
ment and the business purpose. The Board could assert as justification the
increased safety and efficiency resulting from Miller's assignment since he
could perform complete inspections without the threat of physical vio-
lence. This would establish the relationship between the practice and the
purpose, that is, compliance with public health regulations. In doing this,
the Board would sustain its required burden to rebut the charge of discrim-
ination.
The last aspect of the Lorillard test' 22 requires examination of the alter-
natives available to the Board. The option of forcing white inspectors to
inspect shops where they would be threatened does not appear viable. The
inspectors would perform either minimal inspections or no inspections and
ultimately quit or be fired. This would surely thwart the goal of inspection
of the shops. Likewise, assigning Miller surreptitiously to only black shops
would prove unworkable because he would be unaware of his differential
treatment. The only viable solution available to the Board was to confront
Miller with the situation and offer him the job of inspecting primarily
black shops. Faced with these choices, the Board should be able to show
the degree of absolute necessity required to justify its action.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the courts are not often confronted with cases such as Miller,
such situations do arise, and therefore a method by which a court could
analyze a proposed defense is essential. Though the statement of the
Ninth Circuit that "virtually any prima facie case under Title VII may be
rebutted as job related or necessary to business,"' 1 23 may extend the busi-
ness necessity defense to an extreme degree, a judicial recognition that
business necessity may be utilized in cases of legitimate employer need is
definitely warranted. Adoption of this defense would not be violative of
the purposes of Title VII nor of prior judicial interpretations of the de-
fense.
119. See notes 64-74 and accompanying text supra.
120. Id
121. 615 F.2d at 653-54.
122. See notes 75-78 and accompanying text supra.
123. deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Presently, an employer may be unable to validate a Title VII challenge
to an employment practice. Of the limited judicially recognized defenses
available under Title VII, the defense of business necessity conforms most
easily to the greatest variety of situations. In terms of application of prece-
dent and logic, the defense is not necessarily limited to the situations in
which it is presently applied. Since business necessity was judicially cre-
ated to meet the needs of a unique situation, it can be judicially extended
to meet the needs of other unique situations as they arise.
James J Gupko
